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INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT
IN recent years courts -have found conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act 1
within the integrated multi-corporate enterprise.2 Unlike the offense of mon-
opolizing, a conspiracy to monopolize or to restrain trade requires "joint
action" by at least two parties.3 But, even where there is unified ownership,
separate corporations are held to be separate persons. 4 Thus, a parent cor-
poration and its subsidiaries, whether wholly or -partially owned, can conspire.
For example, should the Ford Motor Company wish to divide Ford, Lincoln,
and Mercury into separate subsidiary corporations, agreements to fix prices
or set production quotas for each line might be illegal.5 Perhaps even the
directors, officers, and agents of a single corporation can conspire.0 If so, a
wide range of corporate activities, now considered immune from Sherman Act
1. Section 1 provides:
"Every contract, combination . . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ..
Section 2 provides:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or coin-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
2. For discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy, see Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-
trust Laws, 44 ILL L. REv. 743, 762 (1950) ; Comment, 47 CoL L. REv. 786, 788 (1947);
Notes, 43 ILL L. Ray. 551 (1948) ; 100 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1006, 1010 (1952).
3. For historical explanation of the joint action requirement, see Rahl, supra note 2,
at 744, and sources cited therein.
4. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (affiliates);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (same); Schine Chain
Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (parent and subsidiaries) ; United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941)
(same).
5. Price-fixing and market division by independent companies are clearly illegal,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (price-fixing);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 399 (1926) (same) ; United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(market division); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (same).
6. White Bear Theater Corp. v. State Theater Corp., 129 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir.
1942) (officers of single corporation) ; Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 633 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) (same). Contra: Nelson Radio & Supply Co.
v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) ; Marion
County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
For legal argument in favor of intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, see Kramer, Dot's
Concerted Action Solely between a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in
Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of The Sherman Adt?,
11 FED. B.J. 130 (1951).
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prosecution, could arguably fall within its ban. Fearing a threat to American
business in the far-reaching implications of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, some commentators have attacked its growth, tagging the concept
"corporate self-abuse"7 and "bath tub conspiracy."8 Others view it hopefully
as the instrument for a "second crack" at the concentration of industry.
0
CONSPIRACY WITHIN THE MULTI-CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
In the modem business world a single enterprise, acting alone, may exert
considerable power over its competitors, customers, and suppliers. A domin-
ant producer such as U. S. Steel can foreclose a part of the steel fabricating
market to competing producers by buying up and merging with an independ-
ent fabricator.10 A large seller like General Motors can force independent
dealers to finance wholesale and retail automotive purchases through its
financing subsidiary by threatening to cut off their supply of GM cars." A
large buyer like A & P can force its suppliers to grant lower prices to itself
than to its competitors by threatening either to take its business elsewhere or
to become its own supplier.'
Conspiracy aside, each of the above single-trader abuses may fall within
the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. If motivated by an intent to monopolize,
U. S. Steel may violate the Sherman Act's Section 2 prohibition of monopoliz-
ing or attempting to monopolize when it forecloses a market to competitors by
merging with an independent fabricator.13 The same merger may also violate
Section 1 prohibitions against combinations in restraint of trade.' 4 General
Motors' financing arrangement is similar to a tie-in sale prohibited by the
Clayton Act.' 5 A & P may violate the Robinson-Patman Act by inducing its
suppliers to grant it discriminatory prices.' 0
TMoreover, the doctrine that a single enterprise can conspire within itself
may give the antitrust prosecutor an alternative theory of illegality with which
7. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAnv. L REv. 27, 51 (1949).
S. Searls, The Antitrust Laws from the Viewpohit of a Private Practitioner in 19.0
IxrrsriuT oN ANTITRUsT LAWS AND Pcn-REGuLATio-s 71, 86 (1950).
9. Note, 110 U. os PA. L. REv. 1006, 1023 (1952). "At present, the theoretical possi-
bilities of the ... doctrine far outmeasure its prospects." Id. at 1025.
10. See text at note 53 infra.
11. See text at note 25 infra.
12. See text at note 40 infra.
13. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-3 (194S). For conflicting
interpretations of leading § 2 cases compare Rostow, Monopoly Under the Shc-rnan Act:
Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. RFv. 745 (1949), uith Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly
or Monopolization: A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILx L. Rwr v. 269 (1949).
14. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
The merger may also violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. See Note, 63 Ya L.J. 233
(1953).
15. See note 29 infra.
16. Note, 47 CoL L. REv. 786, 795 (1947). See also Note, 63 YAmm L.J. 260 (1953).
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to combat each of the above practices. Although an intra-enterprise conspiracy
may be alleged under Section 2's monopoly provisions, the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine has been largely a device for bringing single-trader abuses
within Section l's ban on conspiracy in restraint of trade. The advantages of
a Section 1 prosecution may include criminal penalties,17 treble damage relief,",
avoidance of unfavorable precedent, 19 and the elimination of certain defenses.20
Even where the plaintiff already has a Section 1 allegation based on contract
or combination, an allegation of conspiracy may lighten his burden of proof 21
or extend the statute of limitations.
22
So, in order to avail themselves of such advantages, antitrust prosecutors,
alleging conspiracy, have attempted to establish the necessary "joint action"
within the confines of the single enterprise. And, in large measure, courts
have viewed these attempts with favor, looking more to the economic abuses
before them than to the doctrinal issue presented. Thus, the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine has developed as an ad hoc response to the needs of the
litigator rather than to foster a clearly-defined economic policy. Judicial
failure to impose conceptual limitations on the doctrine has given rise to
speculation concerning its application to factual situations yet unlitigated.
The following case-by-case study of intra-enterprise conspiracy illustrates
the growth of the doctrine and suggests direction for both its extension and
limitation.
Abuses of Market Power
Tie-in sales: the GMAC Case.23 In 1941 the Seventh Circuit upheld a
criminal conviction of General Motors under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
21
17. See text at note 30 infra.
18. See text at note 102 infra.
19. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79, 89 (7th Cir. 1949) (defense of compliance with Robinson-Patman Act and FTC
order).
21. See text at note 51 infra.
22. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910) (conspiracy to drive com-
petitors out of business continues until abandoned); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897) (continuing conspiracy to peg freight rates).
23. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. dcnied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941), 30 CALIF. L. RLy. 204 (1942); 17 IND. L.J. 255 (1942).
24. The Government brought simultaneous criminal actions against General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler for similar practices. Ford and Chrysler entered into consent decrees
contingent on the outcome of the General Motors litigation. Since the General Motors
litigation dragged on for twelve years, there was the continuing problem of how long
Ford's and Chrysler's consent decrees should be extended. Compare Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) (extension granted to Government), with Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948) (no extension). See full discussion
in Haberman & Birnbaum, Auto-Finance Consent Decree: an Epilogue, [1950] WASH.
U.L.Q. 46. In 1952 a consent decree finally terminated the Government's civil action
against General Motors. United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH TnRn Rm. Rm.
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The manufacturing corporation wras held to have conspired with its wholly-
owned sales and financing subsidiaries to compel independent dealers holding
GM franchises to finance the wholesale and retail sales of GM cars through
the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (G'MAC). 2  Special concessions
were made to cooperating dealers. Non-conformers had difficulty in obtain-
ing prompt delivery. If necessary, threats of franchise termination proved
an effective means of coercion.
General Aotors defended on the ground that they were a single-trader.2
Their argument had two parts. First, the joint action requirement of Section
1 forecloses a conspiracy finding when the parties are non-competing units of
a single enterprise. Second, since the enterprise was merely exercising its
right of refusal to deal, the single-trader was at most legally restraining its
own commerce.
The court rejected both aspects of the single-trader defense.2 7 Disregarding
GM's unified ownership, the court held each corporate instrumentality-manu-
facturing, sales, and financing-a separate person for purposes of conspiracy.
When defendants enjoy the benefits of multi-corporate form, they face the
risk of Section 1 liability. Furthermore, said the the court, GM was restrain-
ing not its own trade, but the commerce of third parties.25 Restrictions on fin-
ancing might hinder purchases of GM cars. And, since title passed at the
manufacturer's point of shipment, dealers' commerce in GM cars was the trade
restrained. Furthermore, requiring exclusive use of GMAC forced other
finance companies out of lucrative business in automobile paper.
Defendants probably could not avoid antitrust liability on this issue by
reorganizing into a single corporation. In essence GM's practice was a tie-in
sale, forbidden by Section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 9 The defendants were using
a legal monopoly (that in GI cars) to gain advantages in another market
(that for financing). The court's conspiracy theory merely provides prose-
cutors with greater latitude in selecting a theory of illegality. In the GM. IC
case, for example, by alleging a Section 1 conspiracy, the prosecution secured
criminal sanctions unavailable under the Clayton Act, and also avoided un-
favorable precedent that had developed under Section 3.0
q, 67,324 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (enjoins coercion of dealers). Ford and Chrysler entered intoi
almost identical consent decrees. United States Y. Ford Motor Co., id. c ,7,437 (X.D.
Ind. 1953); United States v. Chrysler Corp., id. 1 67,438 (N.D. Ind. 1953).
25. The facts are set out in United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 37, 385-
97 (1941).
26. Id. at 404.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 402.
29. "But even if the single trader doctrine were applicable, it would not help the
appellants. [citing § 3 tie-in cases]." Id. at 404. But cf. United States v. Investors
Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951), 52 COL. L. REV. 10f.5 (1952)
(loans not sale of commodity under § 3). And see Note, 03 Y.U. LJ. 389, 390 (1954).
30. 121 F.2d 376, 404 (1941). The unfavorable precedent was Pick Mfg. Cv. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aft'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1930f) (tie-in sale t.f
replacement parts permissible under § 3 to protect good will). See also note 29 supra.
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Tied-in Purchases: The Movie Exhibitor Cases."1 The Supreme Court
found conspiracy within single enterprises in the Crescent, Griffith, and
Schine cases. All involved movie exhibitors owning widespread chains of
theaters.3 2 In each case the multi-corporate enterprise owned the only theater
in some towns and competed with independents in others. By pooling the buy-
ing power of all theaters, the enterprise was able to obtain exclusive privileges
from film distributors. These privileges deprived competitors of first- or
second-run pictures for unreasonable periods of time. Such abuse of massed
buying power violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The close-knit form of each defendant corporate group did not prevent a
finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy. In Crescent and Griffith, the con-
spiracy included affiliated corporations and their officers.3 3 In Schine, parent
and subsidiary corporations together with their officers were parties to the
conspiracy.3 4 In all three cases the defendants were clearly a unified economic
unit under centralized control.3 5
Single corporate form would not -have avoided Sherman Act liability in any
of the movie cases. The Government probably alleged a Section 1 conspiracy
to hedge against the possibility that the court would find no "specific intent"
to monopolize. Crescent assumed that a single exhibitor engaged in the same
plan of economic warfare as the multi-corporate defendant would not run
afoul of the Sherman Act. 0 However, Griffith definitely indicated that a
single-trader who used the buying power of an entire circuit to negotiate
films for competitive as well as closed towns could violate Sections 2.37
Coercing Price Discrimination: The A & P Case.8 In a criminal prosecu-
tion the Seventh Circuit upheld Section 1 conspiracy charges against the
31. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944).
32. The Crescent defendants controlled theaters in 70 small towns in five states. In
Griffith, the parties had theaters in 85 towns over a four state area. In Schine, the chain
consisted of 148 theaters in six states. The facts of the case are set out, as follows:
Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, supra note 31, at 113-115; United States v.
Griffith, supra note 31, at 102-103; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra note
31, at 176-82.
33. United States v. Griffith, supra note 31, at 101-102; United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., supra note 31, at 176.
34. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, supra note 31, at 116.
35. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, supra note, 31, at 115; United States v.
Griffith, supra note 31, at 102; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra note 31,
at 178.
36. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra note 31, at 183.
37. United States v. Griffith, supra note 31, at 108.
38. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949), afflrming 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946). For differing views see Dirlam
& Kahn, Antitrust Policy and the Big Buyer: Another Look at the A & P Case, 60
J. Poi- EcoN. 118 (1952); Adelman, The A & P case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q.J. ECoN. 238 (1949) ; Notes, 58 YALE L.J. 969 (1949); 47 COL. L. Rlv. 786
(1949) ; 15 U. OF Cal. L. Rxv. 392 (1948).
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A & P grocery chain. By threatening to boycott suppliers and go into the
food business itself, satellite corporations and key officers coerced food sup-
pliers into granting lower prices to ACCO, the buying corporation, than to
competing brokers.30 These price discriminations were sometimes compound-
ed when ACCO resold to A & P's retail competitors at higher prices than
those charged to A & P's own outlets.
It is doubtful that A & P could escape antitrust liability for this practice
by becoming a single corporation. The court did not decide whether defend-
ants violated the Robinson-Patman Act. But that statute forbids a buyer
knowingly to induce or receive price discriminations. A & P seems liable
under the court's statement of the facts.40 However, under a Section 1 theory
the Government had a lighter burden of proof, since it avoided the necessity'
for introducing data to show lack of cost justification.
41
GMAC, the Movie Cases, and A & P illustrate the application of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy concept to a variety of single-trader abuses-tie-ins,
refusals to deal, price discrimination, and unfair use of market leverage. Each
of the abuses, although condemned under a conspiracy charge, could have been
attacked under other specific provisions of the antitrust statutes. Use of the
conspiracy charge gave prosecutors an alternative theory of illegality offering
tactical advantages or sanctions not available elsewhere.
The abuses struck down in these cases were of a type long condemned by
the antitrust laws. In each case the single-trader was found guilty not of re-
straining his own trade, but of restraining the trade of third parties. General
Motors restrained the trade of independent automobile dealers and finance
companies; the movie exhibitors deprived competitors of first-run pictures
by obtaining exclusive privileges; A & P coerced its suppliers into granting
it discriminatory prices. The right of an enterprise to restrain its own trade
(i.e., fix its own prices or divide its own markets) was not impaired by any
of these decisions.
Vertical Integration
The Yellow Cab Case.4" Starting in 1929, the controlling shareholder of a
Michigan cab manufacturer initiated a plan for securing control of the taxicab
operating business in four key cities.43 The enterprise expanded by setting
39. The facts are set out in United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 81-7 (7th Cir. 1949).
40. See sources cited note 16 supra.
41. For a full discussion of the Government's burden of proof in a Robinson-
Patman prosecution see Note, 63 YALn LJ. 260 (1953).
42. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 21S (1947).
43. The facts are taken from United States v. Yellow Cab Co., sutra note 42, at
220-5.
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
up new operating companies, by buying the stock or assets of existing oper-
ators, and by foreclosing chattel mortgages against debtor cab drivers. At the
time of the prosecution, the defendants controlled, through interlocking stock
ownership, 86% of the cab licenses in Chicago, 15% in New York, 100%0
in Pittsburgh, and 58% in Minneapolis. In all, defendants controlled 5000
taxicab licenses. The integrated operating companies bought their cabs ex-
clusively from the manufacturing corporation. In a divestiture proceeding,
the manufacturing corporation, its sales subsidiary, and various operating
companies were charged with conspiring with their common management
to violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court reversed lower court dismissal of the complaint. 44 The
Government's allegations revealed at least three grounds for liability on the
motion to dismiss. First, limiting the market outlets for other cab manufactur-
ers restrained the trade of third parties.45 Second, since the integrated cab
operating companies may have been charged "higher than open-market
prices" for cabs bought from the parent manufacturer, the defendants were
restraining their own trade.46 Finally, the integration was an attempt to mon-
opolize since it resulted from calculated purchase for control rather than
normal expansion. 47 The amount of the market still open to other cab manu-
facturers was irrelevant, since the 5000 controlled cabs constituted an appre-
ciable segment of the cab-sales market.48 Mr. Justice Murphy, for the Court,
summarily rejected the single-trader defense to conspiracy.4 9 Separate cor-
porations provided the necessary parties.
The Department of Justice interpreted this theory as damning vertical inte-
gration per se.50 Every vertical integration to some extent shuts off a market
of sale or source of supply from competitors. Moreover, depending ol the
fortuities of inter-corporate bookkeeping, the enterprise may charge its unit
a higher than market price.5 ' Thus the Justice Department's theory would
condemn a business that has expanded by building new units, as well as a
business that has bought out existing concerns. And if a vertically integrated
business encompasses an appreciable volume of commerce, Sherman Act Iia-
44. Four opinions are involved: United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170
(N.D. Ill. 1946), in which the trial court dismissed the complaint; 332 U.S. 218
(1947), reversing the dismissal; 80 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1948), giving judgment
to defendants after trial; 338 U.S. 338 (1949), affirming the judgment.
45. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-7 (1947).
46. Id. at 224-5.
47. Id. at 227-8.
48. Id. at 226.
49. Id. at 227.
50. The Department of Justice interpretation of Yellow Cab is summarized in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 521 (1948).
51. See Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Power, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rm-v.




bility would follow regardless of the percentage of the market still open to
competitors.
In Cohmbia Steel 52 the Supreme Court deflated Yellow Cab. The Court
held that U. S. Steel's acquisition of a small west coast fabricator did not
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Reed limited Yellow Cab's
holding to the Section 2 offense of attempting to monopolize. The new test
for Section 1 was in terms of market control. Since the new subsidiary ac-
counted for only 3% of the west coast demand for rolled steel, the Court
decided that enough of the west coast market for fabricated steel was still
open to other steel producers. And because no specific intent to monopolize
tainted the transaction U. S. Steel did not violate Section 2.
The area of illegality in vertical integrations has not been expanded by the
development of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Read together, Yellow
Cab and Columbia Steel indicate that whether the integration takes single- or
multi-corporate form is irrelevant for Sherman Act purposes. If the enter-
prise was assembled through a union of formerly independent businesses, even
a single corporation satisfies Section l's joint action requirement as a "cum-
bination." Liability here depends on market power. And a single corpora-
tion, whether it expands by merger or by building a new outlet or source of
supply, is vulnerable under a Section 2 monopolization theory if there is an
intent to suppress competition. On the other hand, if the integration has no
significant effect on competition it is inmmne under any theory.*
Per Se Offenses
When two or more independent companies agree to fix prices or divide
markets, courts find a per se violation of Section 1.54 Since the integrated
enterprise fixes its own prices and divides its markets as a matter of co-
ordinated management, business has viewed with alarm the recent combination
of per se illegality with intra-enterprise conspiracy.m
Market Division: The Tinzken Case.50 American Timken, with its British
and French affiliates, was held to have conspired to divide the world market in
antifriction bearings in violation of Section 1.5 At the time of the Govern-
ment's civil prosecution, the three companies manufactured 25% of the
52. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 520-23 (1943).
53. E.g., if U. S. Steel built rather than bought facilities like those of Columbia Steel,
no part of an existing market would be foreclosed to competitors. Id. at 532.
54. See cases cited note 5 supra.
55. For the view that the doctrine puts the parent-subsidiary form "in serious peril"
see Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy in A2-ur c n BAR AsSoCrArToN SEC-
TION OF ATITRUST LAW 38 (1953).
56. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), 25 Tc.iP.
L.Q. 227; 100 U. OF P.a. L. REv. 1026 (1952). See Oppenheim, Foreign Conmncree t ndcr
the Sherman Act-Points and Implications of the Timken Case, 42 T.M.R. 3, 5-7 (1952).
57. The facts are set out in the district court opinion, United States v. Timen Rollcr
Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 310-12 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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antifriction bearings in the United States, 20% of the total British production,
and 10% of the French output. American Timken owned 30% of British
Timken's stock. British and American Timken each owned 50% of French
Timken. The interlocking stock ownership was, however, born in sin. For a
period of eighteen years before American Timken bought its interest in the
British company the two enterprises had used patent licenses to divide terri-
tories. And after the stock purchases, the two companies acted like inde-
pendents and "jealously guarded" their respective interests. Stock ownership
was a way to share profits and enforce market division.
Defendant, American Timken, argued that it had merely engaged in a
joint venture with British TimkenY8 Under this theory the three companies
were in effect a single-trader. The market division was, therefore, reasonably
incidental to the common enterprise and a permissible restraint. However,
the trial court viewed the companies as a loose-knit combination condemned
by anti-competitive intent. 9 They were really independents who had long
tried to avoid competing. The stock ownership was an outgrowth of that
intent. In organizing French Timken, the conspirators illegally created a joint
production and sales agency to share a foreign market. The trial court would
'have taken a different view if American Timken had built its own plants
abroad. 60 The Supreme Court affirmed on a more comprehensive theory. The
Court rejected the joint venture defense. "Perhaps every agreement and
combination to restrain trade could be so labeled.""' The ambiguous facts fit
into alternative molds of Section 1 illegality. On the one hand, the companies
were separate contracting parties whose agreements to suppress competition
among themselves were illegal per se, regardless of predatory intent.02 On
the other hand, they constituted a traditionally illegal combination whose ag-
gregation of trade restraints injured competitors and restricted imports and
exports of bearings. 3
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent suggests that the majority in Timkcn outlaw
the corporate subsidiary form of doing business.0 4 He imputes to the major-
ity the Government's oral argument that divisional form would insulate the
companies from Section 1 censure.0 5 Thus, if the three companies reorganized
into a single corporation, the joint action requirement of Section 1 could not
be satisfied. If correct, such an interpretation of Timken would cripple anti-
58. Defendants' argument is summarized in Note, 100 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 1006, 1016
(1952).
59. 83 F. Supp. 284, 306, 310-11 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
60. Id. at 306, 312. For a similar view see United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950).
61. 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (emphasis supplied).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 607.




trust enforcement. And that interpretation goes too far. Under Jackson's
view the enterprise would be liable per se if it built rather than bought a
foreign subsidiary and allotted an appropriate territory to each corporation.
To read Timken in this fashion would undermine the useful functions of the
corporate subsidiary form of doing business. Affiliates and subsidiaries serve
many legitimate business purposes :CG increasing facility in financing; avoiding
the difficulty or impossibiliy of qualifying the parent company as a foreign
corporation in a particular state ;67 avoiding complications involved in the pur-
chase of physical assets; retaining the good will of an established business
unit; minimizing taxation ;r3 securing managerial efficiency; limiting tort and
contract liability. 9 Moreover, the subsidiary form is often the only effective
way of competing in a foreign country. 70 It avoids otherwise insuperable
barriers to foreign trade like high tariffs, quota restrictions, and currency
controls.
The majority in Timken doubtless intended a less startling theory of anti-
trust illegality. The venerable American Tobacco case,7 ' cited by the Court,
casts light on the majority view. American Tobacco had purchased interests
in foreign corporations with a view towards dividing the world market. Just
as in Timken, the acquired corporations remained ostensibly independent com-
petitors of American Tobacco. The 1911 Supreme Court presaged Timben's
holding: "[T]he assailed combination ... whether looked at from the point
of view of stock ownership or from the standpoint of the principal corporation
and the subsidiary corporations, viewed independently, ... comes within the
prohibitions of the ... Sherman Act." 72 So also the facts in Timhen wavered
between alternative patterns of Section 1 liability. The majority probably
meant: insofar as the parties acted like independent competitors before and
after integration, market division is illegal per se; insvfar as they are inte-
grated, it is an illegal combination condemned by the rule of reason.
This view of Timken accords with the Supreme Court's theory in Columbia
Steel,7 3 decided three years before Timken. In addition to the vertical inte-
gration involved there, the acquired company was also a former competitor
66. For a discussion of business purposes of the multi-corporate organization, see
Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Sudsfdiary Corporations, 39 YA.E UJ.
193 (1929); DEWING, THE FINAN IAL POLICY oF CouRoR"rxONs 105-0 (1946).
67. Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943) (Nebraska cor-
poration organizes subsidiary in California to engage in intra-state transportation busi-
ness otherwise barred to foreign corporations).
68. For income tax and excess profits tax advantages, see Jensen, Tax Effccts of
Splitting a Corporation into Two or More Units, 92 J. AccouNT.ANcy 294, 295 (1951).
69. LATTY, SUBSMIARIES AND AFFILIATED ConroaATio,.s 192-2Z0 (1936).
70. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603, 605-05 (1951)
(dissenting opinions).
71. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 105 (1911).
72. Id. at 184.
73. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-31 (1943).
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of U. S. Steel in structural steel fabrication and in the manufacture of pipe.
Although the acquired subsidiary would doubtless be a party to intra-enter-
prise market division after its purchase, the Court approved the transaction.
To determine the legality of the combination, the Court looked to the per-
centage of the market controlled, the strength of remaining competition, the
purposes of the acquisition, the probable development of the industry, and
consumer demand for the product. 74 And if U. S. Steel had built rather than
bought the west coast fabricator, there would be no Section 1 liability.7"
In accord with the Columbia Steel theory, the district court in the Imperial
Chemicals case 76 did not interpret Timken to condemn the corporate sub-
sidiary form. There DuPont was held to have violated Section 1 by sharing
ownership of foreign corporations with an English competitor. The joint
ownership was part of a plan to divide the world market in munitions and
other commodities. The district court's decree expressly ordered DuPont
to maintain wholly-owned subsidiaries instead of the jointly-owned compan-
ies.
77
Price Fixing: the Kiefer-Stewart Ca.se.78  Kiefer-Stewart, an Indiana
liquor wholesaler, won treble damages from two affiliated liquor producers.
The defendants, Seagram and Calvert, deprived the wholesaler of his liquor
supply when the wholesaler refused to resell at certain maximum prices fixed
by the producers. Neither Indiana nor federal fair trade legislation protected
maximum resale price maintenance.
7 9
The liquor distributors argued that they were in fact a single-trader, ex-
ercising a unified business' right to set the terms on which it would deal.80
Defendants tried to distinguish earlier cases rejecting the single-trader de-
fense. The argument was that earlier cases had condemned single-traders
only when they engaged in "coercive" practices. The alleged restraint in
Kiefer-Stewart, defendants claimed, was merely "voluntary." Both affiliates
had willingly agreed to set resale prices, as a matter of internal business
policy.
74. Id. at 527.
75. Id. at 532.
76. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (territorial division constitutes a restraint) ; United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree).
77. Id. at 242.
78. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). For
discussion see Comment, 18 U. OF Cin. L. REv. 369, 376 (1951) ; Note, 21 TENN. L. R v.
881 (1951).
79. The Indiana statute protects only minimum price maintenance. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 66-302 (Burns, 1937). The Miller-Tydings Act, in effect at the time, protected only
minimum price fixing allowed by state statute. 50 STAT. 693 (1939), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1946).
80. For defendants' argument See The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. Rv.
107, 122-3 (1951). The argument was proposed by Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust
Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 766 (1950).
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The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and upheld plaintiff's
million dollar recovery against the distributors.8 ' The producers conspired to
fix prices.8 2 The Seventh Circuit incorrectly thought the price fixing was
justified as a weapon against monopolistic combinations of liquor wholesalers. 3
But price fixing is illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 4 The
fact that both defendants were under common ownership and control did
not prevent a finding of conspiracy "especially... where, as here, respondents
hold themselves out as competitors." sm The Court ignored defendants' distinc-
tion between "voluntary" and "coercive" restraints.
The Antimonopoly Bureau of the FTC read Kiefcr-Stcwart broadly. Nine
months after the Supreme Court opinion, the Bureau brought separate com-
plaints against the two largest liquor distiller-distributors.8 0 The complaints
charge Seagram and Schenley with conspiracy among their respective sub-
sidiary corporations. The offense is price fixing in violation of Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC attack is purely and simply on
the defendants' form of business organization. The companies apparently indi-
cated they might reorganize their businesses into single corporations. 8 T The
FTC prosecutor in charge of the case then explained, "It is possible that these
two companies might reorganize on a divisional basis, in which event the basic
part of the causes of action stated in the complaints would be removed."8s
The FTC attack is probably designed to curtail each distiller's practice of
putting out several brands. An oligopolist uses separate brands to secure
maximum profits.8 9 The seller segregates the market by products differ-
entiated through advertising to make as many separate bargains as possibleY0
"It is not unusual for the identical product to be bottled under several differ-
ent labels and at different prices. . . ."91 Forcing divisional reorganization
upon distillers cramps this practice in two ways. Federal and state adver-
81. Plaintiff recovered $975,000 plus 1$50,000 attorney fees. 182 F.2d 228, 229 (7th
Cir. 1950).
82. 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
83. 182 F.2d 228, 233-4 (7th Cir. 1950). The circuit court also thought no concert
between defendants was established. Id. at 234. But the Supreme Court held there wvas
agreement. 340 U.S. 211, 213-14 (1951).
84. Id. at 213.
85. Id. at 215.
86. Distillers Corporation-Seagrams, Ltd., FTC Dkt. 6047 (pending); Schenley
Industries, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6043 (pending); 3 CCH TRan Rru. REP. , 11,203 (com-
plaints issued Sept. 24, 1952).
87. For full discussion of the liquor companies' probable plan to abolish their Sub-
sidiaries and this plan's consequences, see The Wall Street Journal, December 8, 1953,
p. 1, col. 4.
83. Communication to the YALEz LANw Jour-NAL, from FTC Bureau of AntimonopLoly,
dated December 15, 1952.
89. GmEun, FUND -ENT.LS OF Ecooxcs 393 (4th ed. 1943).
90. Id. at 414.
91. BoREGARD & GLUS-ER, THE DisTiLLD SPnuTs IznmsTRY: A 'MX-'ln:N SLt-
vEY 145 (unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1950).
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tising regulations might require all brands of the same company to mention
the company's name on the label. 2 And one corporation cannot do business
under several brand names in some states.
93
Such a roundabout attack on the symptoms of oligopoly is absurd. It seems
doubtful that forced reorganization would substantially curtail the monopolistic
profits that accrue when a few big sellers find their self-interest served by
advertising competition rather than by price competition. Oligopoly profits
would continue even if each large seller were restricted to a single brand.9
t
Moreover, the FTC need not charge conspiracy to attack these branding
practices. Section 5 condemns unfair and deceptive methods of competition
regardless of conspiracy.05 The net effect of the FTC attack would be greater
integration rather than less. And the Antimonopoly Bureau's broad reading
of Kiefer-Stewart, if followed by the courts, opens the door to unwarranted
treble damage suits against multi-corporate business. Since any well-run
multi-corporate business coordinates price policy, treble damage claimants
could always show a price fixing conspiracy.
The facts of Kiefer-Stewart do not support the FTC's interpretation. The
Supreme Court was not dealing with simple price fixing but with resale price
maintenance, enforced by a refusal to sell. The Maguire Act of 1952 now
legalizes Seagram's and Calvert's behavior, if state statutes also allow the
practice.96 But without that protection, resale price fixing by a single-trader
is clearly illegal T The Shrader's Son case had condemned price maintenance
contracts implied from a course of dealing.08 And on the Beech-Nut case
theory,99 the FTC has enjoined attempts by a single corporation to install
a system similar to Seagram's plan regardless of contract. 1° ° But private
parties cannot sue under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act on
which the Government usually based its prosecution.101 Kicfer-Stewart did
not extend the area of practice illegal to single-traders, but rather extended the
treble damage remedy to injured parties.
92. Krasney, The FTC Complains, J. of Commerce, October 3, 1952, p. 9, cols. 4-5.
93. Ibid.
94. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. op
CliI. L. Rv. 567, 576-7 (1947).
95. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
96. 66 STAr. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).
97. Comment, 19 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 837, 849-61 (1951), and cases cited therein,
98. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
99. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
100. See, e.g., Hill Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
662 (1926) (keeping a "do-not-sell" list); Q. R. S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th
Cir. 1926) (procuring agents and retailers to report price cutters) ; Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d
22 (Ist Cir. 1926) (informing dealers that price cutters will be refused sales).
101. Samson Crane Co. v. United National Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass.
1949), aff'd mere., 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (dismissing private suit for want of
jurisdiction). Cf. Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923) (denying
admission of FTC order in private suit).
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Thaken and Kiefer-Stewart indicate the Supreme Court's willingness to
find conspiracy when a single-trader injures other businesses by its anti-
competitive conduct. Neither case provides support for the argument that
restraint of one's own trade is illegal per se. The interpretation apparently
given these cases by enforcement agencies should not be followed.
CoNsPiRcA- WITHIN THE SINGLE CorroRATioN
WYhile fearing that multi-corporate form might be offensive per se, antitrust
defendants have argued hopefully that single corporate form is a complete
defense to intra-corporate conspiracy charges. Although some courts have
accepted this view by refusing to find the two or more parties essential to
conspiracy in the officers, directors, and agents of the single corporation, the
Supreme Court has left this question open.
The recent Motorola case 102 was a treble damage suit charging a single
corporation with .conspiring to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.0 3
Plaintiff, a wholesale distributor of electrical appliances, sold in various coun-
ties in Alabama and Florida assigned to him by his supplier, Motorola. In
1949, Motorola refused to renew his one-year franchise. The refusal stemmed
from a dispute about whether the wholesaler's franchise should include com-
mercial communications equipment in addition to the radios, phonographs, and
television sets he had been licensed to distribute. Motorola insisted (a) on
marketing its communications equipment through its own agencies, (b) on
prohibiting the wholesaler from handling its competitors' communications
equipment. When plaintiff did not accept these terms, Motorola refused to
renew his franchise. The wholesaler's principal legal theory Was that Motor-
alo's officers had conspired to restrain trade by refusing to deal with him.
The Fifth Circuit upheld trial court dismissal of the complaint, one judge
dissenting.' 0 Single corporate form was a defense per se. Given multi-
corporate form, the court indicated it would find conspiracy.' °  But the court
said it is "absurd" to believe a single corporation "conspired with itself to
restrain its trade in its own products."' 00 The corporate officers could not
be parties to the conspiracy since they "were only acting for the defendant
corporation."'107 Nor could plaintiff complain that Motorola's conduct was a
102. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. -. Motorola, Inc., 200 F2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
103. The facts are taken from the opinion of the court, Nelson radio & Supply Co.
v. Motorola, Inc., supra note 102, at 912-13, and from Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-4.
104. Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., mupra note 102.
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single person offense. Even if the contract sought to be imposed was illegal
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, that Act does not apply since the plaintiff
was injured not by a sale but by a refusal to sell.108 The court nowhere
analyzes possible anti-competitive effects of defendant's conduct.
A recent district court opinion follows Motorola in refusing to recognize
intra-corporate conspiracy. 10 9 The court dismissed a complaint charging the
Carnation Company and its officers with conspiring to drive small purchasers
in an Arkansas milkshed out of business by maintaining abnormally high
prices.110
The Motorola and Carnation holdings are in apparent conflict with cases in
two other circuits. In Patterson v. United States,"' the Sixth Circuit upheld
conspiracy charges against twenty-eight officers and agents of a cash register
corporation. The corporation itself was not a party to the criminal antitrust
prosecution. Defendants secured control of 95% of the cash register market
after harassing competitors with spies, bribes, and threats of patent infringe-
ment suits. The Government prosecuted under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Similarly, in White Bear Theater Corp. v. State Theater Corp.,1
1 2
the Eighth Circuit held that a single movie exhibitor corporation and its
officers conspired to violate Sections 1 and 2. The court awarded treble
damages to another theater almost driven out of business by defendant's prac-
tice of buying more films than it needed. Both White Bear and Patterson pos-
sibly may be distinguished on their facts as attempts to monopolize." 8 But in
both cases, defendants also violated Section 1. Despite this doctrinal clash
on whether a single corporation can conspire with itself, the Supreme Court
refused to review Motorola.
11 4
The Fifth Circuit's view in Motorola should not be followed. Kiefer-Stew-
art 115 is authority for a contrary view. In the liquor wholesaler decision, a
multi-corporate single enterprise satisfied the joint action requirement of
Section 1. It seems anomalous that artificial persons within a single enterprise
108. Id. at 915.
109. Marion County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (WD. Ark.
1953).
110. Id. at 63.
111. 222 Fed. 599, 633 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915). The court
reversed the district court on other grounds. Id. at 626.
112. 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942).
113. Plaintiff in Motorola would have done well to allege a § 2 violation in addition
to the § 1 charge. Courts have held that refusals to deal may constitute an attempt to
monopolize. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1927) (refusal to sell to wholesaler is attempt to monopolize distribution of film);
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (with-
holding deliveries of rugs to distributor is attempt to monopolize). For analysis see
Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1135 (1949).
114. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
115. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
See sources cited note 78 supra.
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can conspire for Section 1 purposes, while real persons within a single corpora-
tion cannot do so. The Supreme Court has often held that businesses may not
avoid antitrust liability by accidents of form. 1 0  In both Motorola and
Kiefer-Stewart, defendants used refusal to deal as a weapon to effectuate
practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. Section 3 of the Clayton Act may well
forbid Motorola's sales to its seventy-nine distributors on the condition that they
refrain from dealing with competitors.117 Such a prohibtion is at least as
clear as the policy forbidding resale price maintenance when unprotected by
fair trade laws.":8
Finding intra-corporate conspiracy would not engulf in per se illegality
every business refusing to sell to a willing buyer. In the Motorola situation,
defendant can assert the traditional defenses to treble damage actions.110
Private suitors must prove their injury was caused by the alleged illegal prac-
tices. 20 Courts will deny recovery if the refusal to deal is a "private contro-
versy" in which "the public interest is not involved."'' 2 And the oft-expressed
dictum that all concerted refusals to deal are illegal per se does not necessarily
mean what it says. The Supreme Court has never condemned a refusal to
deal without a "thorough canvassing of the facts."' 2 Even the Fashion
Orighintors' Guild case, thought to stand for illegality per se, indicates that
group boycotts could be justified by the rule of reason.Y2 The determinants
of legality are the purpose of the refusal, its effects on competition, and the
market power of defendants. 12 4 Defendants' form of organization should be
irrelevant to antitrust enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The joint action requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act need not
hinder antitrust enforcement. In the modern business world multiple parties
are always available to constitute a combination, contract, or conspiracy.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
117. See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. The Mlagrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346
(1922) (agreement not to handle competitors' goods); Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150
F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945) (same). The legality of
fotorola's plan has yet to be tested.
118. See text at note 97 mipra.
119. See Comment, 61 YAiz L.J. 1010, 1028-33 (1952).
120. Id. at 1016.
121. Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 521-2 (10th Cir. 1950) (denying
recovery for franchise termination) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenb: Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp.
824, 828 (D. Md. 1938) (same).
122. Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1138 (1949).
123. "The purpose and object of the combination, its potential power, its tendency
to monopolize, the coercion it could and did practice ... all brought it within tie policy
of the prohibition." Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 LLS. 457, 4W7
(1941).
124. Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1138-9 (1949).
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Courts have consistently held that a multi-corporate unified business satisfies
the joint action formula. The officers of a single corporation should likewise
be separate persons for purposes of antitrust enforcement.
Overemphasis on the conspiracy aspect of a Section 1 violation, however,
leads to strange results. By combining intra-enterprise conspiracy and per se
restraints, antitrust enforcement agencies have made the form of organization
the determinant of legality. The justice Department and FTC prosecutors
have conceded that single corporate form is a defense per se.126 The Anti-
monopoly Bureau of the FTC has suggested that multi-corporate form is an
offense per se.126 Fortunately, the decisions do not support either view. Only
the questionable holdings in Motorola and Carnation indicate that a single
corporation is immune from Section 1. And in every case in which an intra-
enterprise conspiracy was found, defendants would have been liable for an
alternative single-person offense.
The true single-trader defense is not concerned with conspiracy at all. It is
grounded in the proposition that, absent monopoly, restraints within the con-
fines of a single enterprise, i.e., internal price and distribution policies, have
no harmful effects on competition. And it would seem to make little difference
whether the business were conducted in single- or multi-corporate form, as
long as a common management controlled throughout. The crucial question
is whether trade of third parties is restrained. This depends on the effect of
defendant's conduct on suppliers, customers, and competitors. Not since
GMAC has the argument been made.' 2 7 But if defendants in a proper case
could show that only a single-trader's own commerce was restrained, the rule
of reason argues strongly that the contention would be upheld.
125. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 607 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
126. See text at note 88 supra.
127. See text at note 26 supra.
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